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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
In addition to the parties named in the caption of the case on appeal,
claimant Hank D. Lachman was served with the verified complaint and has
answered and defended in this matter. (See Record 14).
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) and Utah R. App. P. 3, 4.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
ISSUE NO. 1:

Whether the trial court's finding of fact that "the

United States currency ... had been or was intended to be used by claimant
Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the
laws of the state of Utah..." was clearly erroneous in light of the stipulation
between the parties that the currency that was seized and ultimately
forfeited had not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of
Utah.
ISSUE NO. 2:

Whether the trial court's finding that the

warrantless search of claimant Hank Lachman's trunk and the seizure of the
currency by the Utah Highway Patrol Officers was proper, was correct.
ISSUE NO. 3:

Whether the Utah Forfeiture Statute violates

claimant Hank Lachman's protections from excessive fines under the Utah
and/or United States Constitutions.
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ISSUE NO. 4:

Whether the Utah Forfeiture Statute violates

claimant Hank Lachman's equal protection and due process rights under the
Utah and/or United States Constitutions.
ISSUE NO. 5:

Whether depositing the seized currency into a bank

account constitutes spoliation of evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE: The standard of review of a trial court's findings of
fact is whether the findings "are against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous." State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892
P.2d 1042, 1043 (Utah 1995).
SECOND ISSUE: The standard of review regarding whether a
warrantless seizure was permissible is reviewed for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. One Hundred SeventyFive Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346
(Utah 1997).
THIRD ISSUE: Constitutional questions regarding seizure of
currency are questions of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no

t
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deference to the trial court. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997).
FOURTH ISSUE: Constitutional questions regarding seizure of
currency are questions of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial court. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997).
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the spoliation doctrine is recognized in the
state of Utah is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness, granting no
deference to the trial court's decision. State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah
1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR
RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative
of the issues on appeal:
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1996).
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Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
U.S Const, amend. XIII.
U.S Const, amend. XIV.
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 14
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 9.
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 24.
These provisions are set forth in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT BELOW.

The plaintiff, State of Utah, filed a verified complaint in rem seizure
and forfeiture action on December 21, 1999. (R. 1-5). On January 3, 2000,
claimant received at his home a notice from the United States Postal Service
i

that he had a certified letter at the local United States Post Office. (R. 148,
193). Claimant Hank Lachman received by mail a copy of the complaint in
this matter on January 4, 2000. (R. 148, 193). The envelope was

{

postmarked from Moab, Utah, December 30, 1999. (R. 148, 170, 193). On
January 6, 2000, plaintiff entered a service by publication in The Times-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

Independent, published every Thursday in Moab, Grand County, giving
notice to any claimants of the property seized that they had "twenty (20)
days from the service of this notice upon you, within which to file a verified
answer to the complaint on file herein ..." (R. 149, 180).
On January 24, 2000, Defendant served the answer upon plaintiffs
counsel by placing the answer in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and
likewise mailed the verified answer to be filed with the Court. (R. 149). The
Clerk of Court received the answer on January 26, 2000. (R. 14).
Plaintiffs counsel filed an objection to the answer, claiming that it
should have been filed with the Court by January 24, 2000. (R. 22-23).
Claimant filed a motion for enlargement of time on January 31, 2000, along
with a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion for
enlargement of time. (R. 24-33). Claimant's counsel never received a
response from plaintiffs counsel regarding the motion for enlargement of
time, and thus submitted a notice to submit the motion for enlargement of
time.
Claimant's counsel began to conduct discovery in this matter, taking
the deposition of claimant, serving subpoena upon Utah Highway Patrol

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trooper Keith Wilson to appear at deposition and submitting a Rule 34
request to inspect the evidence in this matter. (R. 42-44).
Claimant's counsel received notice on January 31, 2000 from the Court
that the Forfeiture Hearing would be held in the above matter on February
23, 2000. Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment on February 22,
1999. On February 22, 2000, plaintiff finally filed proof of service upon
claimant, along with the Proof of Publication. (R. 48-49).
Claimant's counsel came to the Forfeiture hearing prepared to present
evidence and cross examine witnesses. (R. 150, 168). The Court however,
indicated that it first wished to rule on claimant's motion for enlargement of
time. (R. 120, 125). The Court wished to know from the parties when the
complaint was mailed to claimant Hank Lachman. (R. 125). Plaintiffs
counsel asserted that the complaint in this matter had been mailed to
claimant on December 21, 1999. Claimant's counsel, having no notice that
the Court wished to have oral argument on the motion for enlargement of
time, was unable to present any evidence or speak with his client regarding
when he received the complaint. (R. 126, 185-186). Claimant's attorney
asked the Court for additional time to prepare supplemental evidence and
1
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memoranda regarding when the complaint was actually mailed and received
by claimant Hank Lachman. (R. 151, 186).
At the hearing, the Court ruled from the Bench that the claimant was
served with the complaint on December 21, 1999, that claimant's answer was
thirteen days late, that the claimant's answer was untimely, that the motion
for enlargement of time was denied and the answer would not be considered
by the Court. (R. 127, 187).
The Court also took the issue of whether the seized currency was
otherwise forfeitable under advisement. (R. 187). At the hearing, the
parties stipulated to undisputed facts to be submitted to the court in
determining whether the currency was forfeitable. (R. 122-123).
After the hearing on February 23, 2000, claimant's counsel requested
that claimant provide him the envelope that the complaint had been mailed
infromMoab. (R. 151, 166). Claimant Lachman had misplaced the
envelope. (R. 194).
On March 23, 2000, the trial court issued a memorandum decision,
ruling that claimant's answer was untimely and would not be considered.
(R.125-134). The trial court also ruled that: 1) the currency was received in

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exchange for a controlled substance, or was intended to be exchanged for a
controlled substance; 2) the seizure warrant that was issued seven days after
the currency was actually seized was proper; 3) Claimant gave his consent to
the UHP officers to search his trunk; and 4) The forfeiture did not violate the
excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R. 131-134).
On March 28, 2000, Claimant Lachman located the envelope and
mailed it immediately to counsel. (R. 194). The envelope demonstrated that
the complaint was mailed from Moab on December 30, 1999. (R. 197).
On April 5, 2000, the district court entered a for
forfeiture order. (R. 135-36). The order was prepared by plaintiffs counsel
without review from claimant's counsel. (R. 136).
On April 10, 2000, claimant filed a notice of objection to forfeiture
order. (R. 137). On April 14, 2000, claimant filed a motion for relief of the
default judgment entered against him and to amend the forfeiture order. (R.

(

144). Oral argument was held on May 17, 2000, whereby the parties
stipulated that the claimant's answer was timely and that it would be
considered by the trial court. (R. 212-214). The trial court also amended the
forfeiture order. (R. 213-215).
4
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Based upon the stipulated facts presented to the trial court, claimant
has appealed this ruling. (R. 221-223).
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:

1.

On or about December 13, 1999, claimant Hank D. Lachman was

stopped and cited by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Ballantyne for
speeding while traveling from his home in Los Angeles, California to Denver,
Colorado on 1-70. (R. 55; 122).
2.

The next afternoon, on December 14, 1999, Mr. Lachman was

pulled over for speeding by Trooper Keith Wilson on 1-70 in Grand County
while heading back to California.
3.

(R. 55; 122)

Mr. Lachman did not in any manner try to evade Trooper Wilson

and was compliant in slowing down and pulling over when Trooper Wilson
turned on his lights.

(R. 55; 122).

4.

Mr. Lachman had a valid California driver's license. (R. 55; 122).

5.

Mr. Lachman was driving a rental car from Budget Rental car

and was an authorized driver of the car. (R. 55; 122).
6.

Shortly after Mr. Lachman was pulled over, Trooper Ballantyne

showed up and pulled along side Trooper Wilson's vehicle. (R. 55; 122).
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.

Trooper Wilson believed that Mr. Lachman was acting very

nervous and that his behavior was evidence that Mr. Lachman was under
the influence of drugs. (R. 56; 122).
8.

Trooper Wilson's vehicle had no video camera inside of it.

Trooper Ballantyne's vehicle was equipped with a video camera that is
programed to turn on when his lights are turned on. (R. 56; 122).
9.

Trooper Wilson asked if they could search the vehicle. Mr.

Lachman gave them consent to search the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. (R. 56; 122).
•

10.

•

• • * •

' •

"

"

•

'

*'

'•

'

•

•

• •

•

Trooper Wilson interpreted Mr. Lachman's consent to search the

passenger compartment to include the trunk and made no distinction
between searching the passenger compartment and the trunk. (R. 56; 122).
11.

Trooper Ballantyne searched the passenger compartment of the

vehicle. His search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of
marijuana, either in raw form or smoked, nor did the search find any drug
paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment or any other controlled
i

substance or contraband. (R. 56; 122).

r

- y

•

T

•••'

'

;
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i

12.

Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and

Mr. Lachman showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. (R.
56; 122).
13.

Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he could search his trunk

and Mr. Lachman informed the Troopers and their superior Sargent
Haycock, that he did not give them consent to search the trunk. (R. 56-57;
122).
14.

Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway. (R. 57; 122).

15.

The Utah Highway Patrol Troopers did not at any time obtain a

warrant to search the vehicle, nor did they have a drug sniffing canine. (R.
57; 122).
16.

In the trunk was located a suit case, which Trooper Wilson

searched without the consent of Mr. Lachman and without a warrant or a
search dog. (R. 57; 122).
17.

In the suitcase, Trooper Wilson located some cigarette papers.

(R. 57; 122).
18.

Hank Lachman is a smoker and rolls his own cigarettes and

informed the UHP Troopers of such. (R. 57; 122).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19.

The cigarette papers were not seized by Trooper Wilson, nor

were they considered to be drug paraphernalia or contraband. (R. 57; 122).
20.

Located in the trunk was also a Christmas package. (R. 57; 122).

21.

There was no drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing

equipment, narcotics, controlled substances or smell of marijuana in the
trunk. (R. 57; 122).
22.

Finally, after the search of the vehicle had been conducted,

Trooper Ballantyne turned on his video camera. (R. 57; 122).
23.

At this point in time, Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and

Sargent Haycock called Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss
what could be done with regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised
the UHP that there was not enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the
Christmas gift. (R. 58; 122).
24.

Mr. Lachman apparently initially denied any knowledge of the

contents of the box. (R. 58; 122).
25.

Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he would open the

package or if they could open the package. Mr. Lachman told the Troopers

4
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that he would not open the package and he did not consent to it being
opened. (R. 58; 122).
26.

Sargent Haycock spoke with Mr. Lachman via cell phone and

told him that if he would leave the package with the Troopers, that he would
then be free to leave. (R. 58; 122).
27.

Mr. Lachman agreed to leave the package with the Troopers as

long as he received a property receipt from them that was signed by Mr.
Lachman, Trooper Wilson and Trooper Ballantyne. (R. 58; 122).
28.

Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt for

the package, his nervousness ended and he calmed down significantly. (R.
58; 122).
29.

Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt, he

then revealed that he did know what was in the box and assured Sargent
Haycock that there was nothing illegal or anything dangerous to his troopers
to be found in the box. (R. 59; 122).
30.

Mr. Lachman was extremely nervous about having so much cash

on hand and placed it in a Christmas box for safety purposes. (R. 59; 122).
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31.

Mr. Lachman knew that there was no controlled substances, no

drug manufacturing equipment and no drug paraphernalia in the box. (R.
59; 122).
32.

Once Mr. Lachman received the assurance that he would get a

receipt, he felt comfortable that he would get the package back later. (R. 59;
122).
33.

The receipt that was given to Hank Lachman lists Hank

Lachman as the subject of the package. (R. 59; 122).
34.

The receipt maintained in the UHP files names Sam Scott as the

owner of the package. (R. 59; 122).
35.

Even though Trooper Wilson originally believed that Mr.

Lachman was under the influence of drugs or had something illegal in his
car, Hank Lachman was not arrested for any violation of Utah law or
otherwise given a traffic citation, but rather was given a "friendly contact"
warning notice and was sent on his way home. (R. 59; 122).
36.

During the seizure procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the
i

package into his trunk without wrapping it or otherwise protecting it from

4
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becoming corrupted by any drug residue that may be in his trunk. (R. 59;
122).
37.

Trooper Wilson did not believe that there was anything

dangerous about the package. (R. 60; 122).
38.

After Mr. Lachman drove off, Trooper Wilson took the package

out of his trunk and opened it without a search warrant and observed that
the package was filled with money. (R. 60; 122).
39.

After observing that the package was filled with money, Trooper

Wilson did not pursue Mr. Lachman. (R. 60; 122).
40.

Trooper Wilson took the package and its contents back to the

Moab UHP Post and opened the package and removed the contents with
Sargent Haycock, without first obtaining a warrant. (R. 60; 122).
41.

The package contained $73,130 in cash. (R. 60; 122).

42.

It is not illegal to carry cash on one's person. (R. 60; 122).

43.

Trooper Wilson and Sargent Haycock found no detectable,

collectable or forfeitable controlled substances on the currency or in the
package materials. (R. 60; 122).
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44.

The currency was deposited into First Security Bank on the

evening of December 14, 1999. (R. 60; 122).
45.

Two days later on December 16, 1999, two dogs alerted to the

odor of narcotics on the packaging materials that contained the $73,130.00.
(R. 60-61; 123).
46.

The amount or type of controlled substances that may have been

sniffed by the dogs was not discernable or otherwise forfeitable. (R. 61; 123).
46.

The currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited

in this case has not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state
of Utah. (R. 61; 122).
47.

The complaint filed in this matter was served via certified mail

upon claimant Hank Lachman, along with Sam Scott. (R. 61; 122).
48.

Mr. Lachman is the only person who filed a verified answer in

this matter. (R. 61; 122).
49.

The only property that was being sought for forfeiture was the

currency. The State of Utah did not attempt to seize and forfeit any of the
i

alleged traces of any controlled substance that was allegedly found on the
packaging materials. (R. 61; 122).
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50.

A seizure w a r r a n t issued on December 2 1 , 1999, seven days after

the currency had been t a k e n from Mr. Lachman and deposited by the Utah
Highway Patrol into a b a n k account. (R. 7-8).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I S S U E NO. I: The U t a h seizure and forfeiture s t a t u t e s require t h a t
the State prove t h a t the currency in question was intended to be used in
exchange for a controlled substance. The parties stipulated before the trial
court t h a t the currency was not traceable to any drug transaction. Therefore
the trial court's order t h a t the currency was forfeitable was clearly
erroneous.
I S S U E NO. II:

The parties stipulated before the trial court t h a t

H a n k Lachman did not give the U H P consent to search his trunk. The U H P
h a d no probable cause to, and no exigent circumstances justified, opening
the trunk. Moreover, once the t r u n k was open, the U H P h a d no probable
cause to, and no exigent circumstances justified, seizing the currency. Thus,
the trial court had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the currency and the
currency should be returned to claimant.
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* ISSUE NO. Ill: The trial court's ruling acts as a fine of over $73,000
to claimant Hank Lachman for a simple speeding warning. Such a result
violates Mr. Lachman's protections against excessive fines under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the
Utah Constitution.
ISSUE NO. IV: The differing burdens of proof between an in rem
civil forfeiture and a forfeiture pursuant to a criminal action, violates
claimant's equal protection and due process protections under both the Utah
and U.S. Constitutions.
ISSUE NO. V: Depositing the currency into a bank account prior to a
seizure warrant issuing and before the claimant could inspect the currency,
constitutes spoliation of evidence. As such, claimant is entitled to a
presumption that the currency would have been beneficial evidence to him.
Given such a conclusion, forfeiture was not justified.

4
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This case is an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding. Utah civil seizure
and forfeiture procedures are contained in a complex statutory framework
found at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13.
Before property can be seized for forfeiture proceeding, a warrant must
first issue. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(3)(a). There are four exceptions to
when a seizure may be made without process. The first exception is when
the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant. Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(i). The second exception is when the property has
been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal
proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(ii). The third exception is
when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety. Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713 (3)(a)(iii). The fourth exception is when "a peace officer has probable
cause to believe that the property has been used in violation of the chapter
and has probable cause to believe that the property would be damaged,
intentionally diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the
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state."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iv). If these requirements are not

strictly complied with, the district court has no jurisdiction to order
forfeiture. Davis v. State. 813 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1991).
Once it is determined that a proper seizure occurred, then the state
has the burden of proving to the trial court the following elements, by a
preponderance of the evidence, before the property can be properly forfeited:
1.
2.

3.

that the person has engaged in conduct
in violation of this chapter;
that the property was acquired by the
person during that period when the
conduct in violation of this chapter
occurred or within a reasonable time
after that period; and
that there was no likely source for the
property other than conduct in violation
of the chapter.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(c).
Currency is treated differently from other property under the statute.
The State is given a rebuttable presumption that "all moneys, coins, and
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug
manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or
forfeitable records of importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
i
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substances are proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter." Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k).
As discussed below, the trial court erred in finding that the currency in
this matter was intended to be used by claimant in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah. Moreover, the search
and seizure was without proper process.
ISSUE NO. 1
THE STIPULATED FACTS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
PROHIBIT FORFEITURE IT IS STIPULATED TO AND
UNDISPUTED BY ALL PARTIES THAT THE CURRENCY WAS NOT
TRACED TO ANY DRUG TRANSACTION IN OR OUT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
The trial court ruled that the currency in this matter "had been or was
intended to be used by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah... ." (R. 215). This was
clearly an erroneous finding by the trial court in light of the stipulation
between the parties that the currency that was seized and ultimately
forfeited had not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of
Utah. (R. 61; 122).
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A;

TRIAL COURT WAS BOUND BY STIPULATED FACTS
BETWEEN PARTIES

The trial court ruled that the proceeds were forfeitable by ignoring the
stipulated facts between the parties. The trial court, in its amended order,
ruled that "The United States currency described herein had been or was
intended to be used by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of the laws of the state of Utah." (R. 215). However,
this finding is in direct contravention of the stipulated facts upon which the
matter was submitted to the trial court. The parties stipulated that "the
currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case has
not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah." (R.
61; 122). It was further stipulated that it is not illegal to have cash on one's
person. (R. 60; 122).
The trial court ignored the stipulation in making this finding.
However, "courts are bound by stipulations between parties." Adkins v.
Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 536 (Utah 2000). As discussed below, without
a showing by the State of Utah that claimant violated the Utah Controlled

!

Substance Act, whether in or out of the state of Utah, plaintiff is not entitled
to these proceeds.

(
-22-
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B.

FORFEITURE STATUTE REQUIRED STATE TO PROVE
VIOLATION OF UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
EITHER IN STATE OF UTAH OR OUTSIDE THE STATE
OF UTAH.

The Utah Legislature has defined what property is subject to
forfeiture. "[N]o property right exists in ... all proceeds traceable to any
violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k). "'Violation of
this chapter' means any conduct prohibited by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a,
37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the state which would be a
violation of the laws of the place where the conduct occurred and which
would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d if the
conduct had occurred in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (g).
1.

STATE WAS UNABLE TO PROVE VIOLATION OF
CHAPTER AND STIPULATED AS SUCH.

The Utah Supreme Court has been very explicit that in order for a civil
in rem forfeiture to occur, the State must show that the claimant to the
money "intended to use the currency in his possession to produce,
manufacture, distribute, or possess drugs..." in violation of the Utah
Controlled Substance Act. State v. One, 892 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1995).
Though the forfeiture statute has been amended since the One decision, to

-23Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

include conduct outside of the state that would be a violation if it had
occurred inside the state of Utah, the burden of the State has not changed to
prove "that the money came from or was intended to be used in a drug
transaction... ." In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency,
823 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1992).
The Utah Supreme Court decision of In re One Hundred Two
Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, had facts remarkably similar to the
present case. A vehicle was stopped and the driver "was anxious to continue
to a California destination." A search was conducted that discovered
$100,900 in U.S. currency. A drug dog alerted on both the money and the
packaging materials. No controlled substances were found in the vehicle or
on the person, but Zigzag rolling papers were located. The driver had a valid
driver's license, but did not own the vehicle he was driving. Charges were
not filed against the driver or any of the passengers.

Id. at 469.

The trial court entered judgment of forfeiture based upon the fact that
the currency had been intentionally hidden and the drug dog alerted on it.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State must prove that the
money came from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction. As no
i
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controlled substances were found in the van or on the person of any of the
occupants and no criminal charges were filed against any of the occupants,
the Supreme Court ruled t h a t the State had not met "an element of
forfeiture." Id. at 470.
Similarly in One, 892 P.2d at 1042, the State of U t a h sought to forfeit
U.S. currency t h a t was seized during a consensual search of a vehicle t h a t
h a d been pulled over for speeding. A drug dog "hit" on one of the stacks of
currency. The Supreme Court ruled t h a t forfeiture was not warranted, as
the State "made no a t t e m p t to prove t h a t the money came from or was
intended to be used in a drug transaction ..." Id. at 1045. The Court noted
t h a t no controlled substances were found in the car or on the person of the
driver and no criminal charges were filed against the driver and t h a t the
"State's sole interest was in obtaining forfeiture of the money carried by [the
driver.] Id.
Similarly, in the present case, the trial court ruled t h a t the currency
was forfeitable, even though it was stipulated t h a t "[t]he currency t h a t was
seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case h a s not been traced to
any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah." (R. 61; 122). No
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controlled substances were found on Mr. Lachman's person or in his vehicle.
(R. 56; 122). No criminal charges were filed against him and he was only
issued a "friendly" warning from the UHP. (R. 59; 122). The trial court's
ruling that forfeiture was justified in this case was clearly erroneous, as
there was no proof upon which the trial court could rely in finding the
currency traceable to a drug transaction.
2.

STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTION
THAT PROCEEDS ARE TRACEABLE TO
VIOLATION OF CHAPTER

Given the stipulated fact that the currency was not traced to any drug
transaction in or out of the state of Utah, it must be questioned if the trial
court relied upon the rebuttable presumption found in Utah Forfeiture Act
that "all moneys, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable
controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug
distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of importation,
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are proceeds traceable
to a violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k). Though the
trial court made no such explicit finding, any implicit reliance upon Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(k) by the trial court was clearly erroneous.
i
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It is undisputed t h a t there was no drug manufacturing equipment or
supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances found in
proximity to the currency. (R. 56-59, 122). There was no controlled
substances found in the passenger compartment, the t r u n k or on H a n k
Lachman's person. (R. 56-59, 122)
Likewise, the trial court was not entitled to base its finding upon the
canine sniff. Canine alerts do not entitle the state to claim the rebuttable
presumption. See e.g. State v. One, 892 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1995) (fact t h a t a
dog hit on one of t h e stacks of currency indicating the presence of narcotics
on the currency did not give rise to claim t h a t rebuttable presumption
applied). It is undisputed and stipulated t h a t any traces of a controlled
substance hit on by the canines was in such a small amount t h a t it was not
forfeitable. (R. 60, 122). There was only a n odor of controlled substance, not
an amount discernable enough to seize and forfeit. 1 (R. 123). U t a h Code

1

The fact that a dog hit on a package that contained a large amount of
currency from the Los Angeles area, where claimant Hank Lachman resides (R.
197), has no probative value to invoke this presumption. In United States v. U.S.
Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court noted that:
If greater than seventy-five percent of all circulated
currency in Los Angeles is contaminated with drug
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Ann. § 58-37-13 (2)(d) requires t h a t the currency be found in proximity "to
forfeitable controlled substances..." in order for there to be any reliance upon
the rebuttable presumption. The complaint filed in this case is for forfeiture
of the currency and not for any controlled substance. Thus, t h e rebuttable
presumption h a s no application in this case, as the currency was not found in
proximity to any forfeitable controlled substance.

residue, it is extremely likely a narcotics detection dog
will positively alert when presented with a large sum of
currency from that area. Given this high degree of
certainty, the probative value of a positive dog alert in
currency forfeiture cases in Los Angeles is significantly
diminished and'the continued reliance of courts and law
enforcement officers on [such an alert] to separate
legitimate currency from drug-connected currency is
logically indefensible." (Citations omitted).
Moreover, the actual currency was never sniffed, as it was deposited into a bank
account the same day it was seized. (R. 60; 122). The fact that the packaging may
have had an odor of controlled substance has no probative value as a contaminated
bill can "go on to contaminate others as they pass through cash registers, wallets,
and counting machines." Id. at 1042. In fact, in one survey:
[o]f eight samples of cash taken from a police chief, a
circuit judge, a state senator, a mayor, a community
college president, the Orlando Sentinel editor, a reverend,
and a county chairman, six out of the eight samples
showed detectable amounts of cocain that were "well
within the range of a drug dog's detection ability'"
Id. at 1043.
Furthermore, it has been stipulated to by both parties that during the seizure
procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the package into his trunk without wrapping it or
otherwise protecting it from becoming corrupted by any drug residue that may be in
his trunk. (R. 59; 122).
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C.

STATE DID NOT MEET BURDEN OF PROOF FOUND IN
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13 (9)(c).

Apart from proving that the proceeds are traceable to a violation of the
chapter, the trial court was required to find that the state had proven all of
the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.
2.

3.

that the person has engaged in conduct
in violation of this chapter;
that the property was acquired by the
person during that period when the
conduct in violation of this chapter
occurred or within a reasonable time
after that period; and r .
that there was no likely source for the
property other than conduct in violation
of the chapter.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(c).
As discussed above, the state did not try to prove that Mr. Lachman
engaged in any conduct in violation of this chapter. (R. 61; 122). Mr.
Lachman was not arrested or charged with any crime. (R. 59; 122). He was
sent off with a friendly warning. (R. 59; 122). No attempt was made to
ascertain when Mr. Lachman obtained the currency. The state did not
attempt prove that there was no likely source for the property other than
conduct in violation of the chapter. (R. 122-123). Thus, the trial court's
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findings that the currency were proceeds of a drug transaction and were
forfeitable were clearly erroneous. This Court should remand this matter
back to the trial court with an order to return the currency, with interest and
taxable costs.
ISSUE NO. 2

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LACHMAN'S TRUNK AND
SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF THE CURRENCY WAS IMPROPER
Even assuming arguendo that the State did meet the elements
necessary to forfeit the currency, it could only meet those elements after an
improper search of Mr. Lachman's trunk and improper seizure of the
currency. Thus, the search and seizure should be invalidated and the
currency returned.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a) requires that property "may be seized
by any peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having
jurisdiction over the property." No such process was issued to either search
the trunk or to seize the contents of the Christmas package until December
21, 1999, one week after the stop of Mr. Lachman. As such, the seizure is
improper and the currency cannot be forfeited to the State.
i
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Claimant Hank Lachman has standing to challenge the search and
seizure of both his vehicle and the opening of the package. Mr. Lachman
was a permissive driver of the Budget Rental Car. Moreover, he was given a
property receipt by the UHP for the package that was taken. The County
Attorney recognized Mr. Lachman's claim and served the complaint upon
him. Thus, Mr. Lachman has standing. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
463 (Utah 1990) ("standing would require at least a claimed right to
possession in the property.")
A.

TRIAL COURT WAS BOUND BY STIPULATED FACTS
BETWEEN PARTIES

The trial court ruled in its amended order, that "the search of Hank
Lachman's trunk by the Utah Highway Patrol Officers was done with Mr.
Lachman's consent ... ." (R. 214). However, this finding is in direct
contravention of the stipulated facts upon which the matter was submitted to
the trial court. The parties stipulated that "Trooper Wilson asked Mr.
Lachman if he could search his trunk and Mr. Lachman informed the
Troopers and their superior Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them
consent to search the trunk, but that Trooper Wilson opened the trunk
anyway." (R. 56-57; 122).
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Moreover, the trial court ruled in its amended order that seizure of the
money in Hank Lachman's trunk was proper. However, the parties
stipulated that plaintiffs counsel advised the UHP that there was not
enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. (R. 58; 122).
The trial court ignored these stipulated facts in making its finding that
Hank Lachman gave consent to his trunk being searched and that the
warrantless seizure was proper. As discussed above, "courts are bound by
stipulations between parties." Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 536
(Utah 2000). As the parties have stipulated the trunk was opened and
searched without Hank Lachman's consent and the proceeds improperly
seized without a warrant, the trial court's finding that Hank Lachman gave
consent and the seizure was proper, was clearly erroneous.
B.

HANK LACHMAN DID NOT GIVE CONSENT TO OPEN
HIS TRUNK AND SEARCH IT,

The UHP was not entitled to search Mr. Lachman's trunk. Law
enforcement officials may neither search nor seize unless and until they have
a warrant supported by probable cause. "Searches and seizures conducted
without a warrant are 'unreasonable per se unless [they] within a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.'" State v.
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Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Bartlev, 784
P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). Specific exceptions to the warrant
requirement include searches "incident to arrest, searches of moveable
vehicles, and seizure of clearly incriminating evidence or contraband in plain
view." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (citins State v. Hugh, 711 P.2d 264, 267
(Utah 1985)). Likewise, consent to search is a "well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement for searches ..." State v. One Hundred SeventyFive Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, U.S. Currency, 942 P.2d 343, 346
(Utah 1997).
C.

THE UHP HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH
TRUNK WITHOUT A WARRANT

Hank Lachman gave no consent to search his trunk. However, even
assuming that the consent exception applies, the Fourth Amendment "does
not permit such warrantless activities unless the police have probable cause
for the ... search." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226; see also State v. Wright, 977
P.2d 505, 506 (Utah App. 1999) ("these exceptions are applicable only when
supported by probable cause." ) A police officer lacks probable cause to
search a trunk when "he did not find any evidence of drug use in the
passenger compartment." Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (citing United States v.
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Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10 th Cir. 1993)). Thus, even if H a n k Lachman
gave consent to search the trunk, the U H P Troopers were not entitled to do
so, as they h a d no probable cause based upon what was found and what was
not found, in the passenger compartment. It is undisputed t h a t the U P H
search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either
in raw form or smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug
manufacturing equipment or any other controlled substance or contraband.
(R. 56; 122). There was no probable cause at t h a t point in time to go any
further with their search.
The present case is similar to the 10 th Circuit case of United States v.
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10 th Cir. 1993), t h a t h a s been adopted by the
U t a h Appellate Courts. 2 In Nielsen, a consensual search of the passenger
compartment occurred. The officer could not find any evidence to
corroborate suspicion of drug use. The officer indicated t h a t he wished to
look in the trunk, and the defendant twice declined to give consent. Id. at
1489 n. 1. The officer opened the t r u n k and discovered controlled substances

2

State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Mavcock,
947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Wright. 977 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah App.
1999).
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and drug paraphernalia. The Tenth Circuit suppressed the evidence
discovered in the trunk, ruling that the officer lacked probable cause to
search the trunk because he did not find any evidence of drug use in the
passenger compartment.

Id. at 1491.

In the present case, Hank Lachman gave the UHP Troopers consent to
search the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Trooper Ballantyne
searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. His search of the
J

•

'•

•

passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either in raw form or
smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug
manufacturing equipment or any other controlled substance or contraband.
Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and Mr.
Lachman showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. Mr.
Lachman informed the Troopers and later affirmed this to their superior
Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them consent to search the trunk.
Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway, a speeding warning was issued,
the Christmas gift was seized ten days before Christmas and Hank Lachman
was sent on his way without even being arrested or cited for any violation of
Utah law minus $73,130. Given these facts, the search of the trunk was
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done without Hank Lachman's consent, was not supported by probable cause
and the seizure was performed without probable cause or a warrant. The
trial court's finding that the search and seizure was proper given these facts
is clearly erroneous.
!>•

THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK WITHOUT A WARRANT
VIOLATED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,

The Utah Constitution not only requires probable cause to search a
vehicle, but also "exigent circumstances in the context of warrantless
automobile searches." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 n. 2 (Utah App.
1995) (Citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); State v.
Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997) (citins State v. Anderson, 910
P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). "Exigent circumstances exist when the car is
movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained." Mavcock, 947 P.2d at 697-8;
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. No such exigent circumstances exist in this
case.
Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and Sargent Haycock called
Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss what could be done with
regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised the UHP that there was
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not enough evidence to obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. These
facts demonstrate that the UHP was able to avail itself to the telephonic
warrant procedure before opening and searching the trunk, but declined to
do so. There were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search
and the trial court's ruling that the search and seizure was proper is clearly
erroneous and violates the Utah Constitution.
E.

THE UHP IMPERMISSIBLY SEIZED THE CURRENCY
WITHOUT A WARRANT.

No warrant was ever requested or granted by the UHP to open the
Christmas package until seven days after the currency had been deposited
into a bank account. County Attorney Benge informed the UHP at the time
of the stop that a warrant would not be granted if one were requested.
However, the UHP seized the currency anyway and waited seven days to
obtain a warrant.
There are four exceptions to when a seizure may be made without
process. None are applicable to this matter. The first exception is when the
seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(i). No arrest of Hank Lachman occurred, nor was the
search of the vehicle or the package done with a warrant. (R. 56-57; 122).
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The second exception is when the property has been the subject of a
prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal proceeding. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(ii). Again, this has no application.
The third exception is when the peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or
safety. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iii). Again, this has no application.
It was stipulated between the parties that Trooper Wilson did not believe
that there was anything dangerous about the package. (R. 60; 122). Mr.
Lachman assured Sargent Haycock that there was nothing illegal in the box
or anything dangerous to his Troopers. (R. 59; 122). Thus, this exception
had no application.
The last exception is when "a peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property has been used in violation of the chapter and has
probable cause to believe that the property would be damaged, intentionally
diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state/'
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (3)(a)(iv). Trooper Wilson obviously did not
believe that the currency had been used in violation of the controlled

-38Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

substances act, as he gave Mr. Lachman a friendly warning and did nothing
to stop him after finding out the box contained money.
Even assuming that Trooper Wilson had probable cause to believe the
currency had been used in violation of the chapter, he had no probable cause
to believe that the property would be damaged, intentionally diminished in
value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state. The UHP was in
possession of the package. It should have obtained judicial authorization
before opening the package and seizing the money. If, as indicated by
William Benge to Sargent Haycock, no warrant would issue, the box and its
contents should have been returned. Thus, the trial court's finding that the
seizure was proper is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
F.

REMEDY FOR IMPROPER SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS
RETURN OF CURRENCY

This Court has been very explicit that when "the statute authorizing
forfeiture expressly requires certain procedures to be followed in seizing the
property to be forfeited ... compliance with such requirements is essential to
enforcement." Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1991) (citation
omitted). When property is "illegally seized because of the lack of a warrant"
and the "basis for forfeiture derived from the connection of the ... [property]
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to the drugs, not because of the possession of the ... [property] was in and of
itself illegal," the trial court has no jurisdiction to order forfeiture and the
property must be returned to the claimant, Hank Lachman. Id.
ISSUE NO, 3
FORFEITURE IN THIS MATTER VIOLATES EXCESSIVE FINES
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS,
The trial court's ruling acts as a fine of over $73,000 for a simple
speeding warning. Such a result violates Mr. Lachman's protections against
excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the Utah Constitution.
A civil sanction may be punitive for purposes of the Excessive Fines
Clause. United States v. Urserv, 518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996); Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). When a case deals with the forfeiture of
monies, "such cases are examined using solely a proportionality
determination." State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah,
994 P.2d 1254, 1257 n. 6 (Utah 2000) (citins United States v. Baiakaiian, 524
U.S. 321, 329 n. 9 (1997): United States v. $273,969.04 United States
Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 466 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999)). "[T]he touchstone of the
constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of
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proportionality: The amount... must bear some relationship to the gravity of
the offense... ." State of Utah v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 8 P.3d
266, 273 (Utah 2000).
In this case, Hank Lachman was not charged with any crime. He was
given a friendly warning by the UHP for speeding. The money was not
traced to any violation of Utah law. The forfeiture of over $73,000 is clearly
a disproportionate fine for any of Mr. Lachman's actions and violates the
Excessive Fines Clause. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court's
order and have the proceeds returned to Mr. Lachman.
ISSUE NO, 4
UTAH'S FORFEITURE STATUTE VIOLATES CLAIMANT'S DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
Had Hank Lachman been charged with a crime in this matter, the
forfeiture proceedings would be "as part of the criminal prosecution as an in
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to
forfeiture." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (9)(b). The property could not be
forfeited unless the state proved claimant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
By failing to charge Mr. Lachman with any crime, the forfeiture statute
permits the state to forfeit Mr. Lachman's property by proving the civil
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standard of proof or by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-13 (9)(c).
By failing to charge Mr. Lachman with a crime and send him back to
California with a UHP friendly warning, the State had a much easier burden
to meet in claiming Mr. Lachman's money. Such disparate treatment
between a criminal and Mr. Lachman, who is charged with nothing, violates
Mr. Lachman's Due Process and Equal Protection Rights under both the
federal and state constitutions.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989):
Article I, section 24 states, "All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation." It extends to
every person the right to enjoy the equal protection
of the law. The purpose of that provision, as
explained in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 669, is to
assure that "persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly, and persons in different
circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." "When persons are
similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out
one person or group of persons from among a larger
class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has
little or no merit." Id. at 671.
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The Utah Forfeiture Statute's differing burdens of proof for a charged
criminal as opposed to someone not charged with a crime violates Hank
Lachman's equal protection rights. Thus, this Court should declare it
unconstitutional and return the proceeds to claimant Hank Lachman.
ISSUE NO, 5
CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS PROCEEDS RETURNED
TO HIM BASED UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE DOCTRINE,
A key piece of evidence was lost in this matter. The UHP deposited the
cash into a bank account on December 14, 1999, instead of putting it into
custodial care pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (5). (R. 61; 122). It
was deposited prior to a warrant issuing and with the knowledge that the
County Attorney did not believe that the money was properly seized. The
actual evidence was lost.
Because of the unwarranted deposit of the currency, Claimant lost the
opportunity to prove that any of the controlled substances found on the
package were a result from being in contact with the currency and not from
any alleged drug transaction. The money could have easily tainted the
package materials. However, claimant lost the opportunity to attempt to
prove such.
-43Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Claimant's counsel has found no Utah appellate decision that expressly
adopts the spoliation of evidence doctrine. However, the present case
warrants such an adoption of the doctrine. Under "the doctrine of'spoliation
of evidence,' which holds that where a party to an action fails to provide or
destroys evidence favorable to the opposing party, the court will infer the
evidence's adverse content." Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415,
419 (Utah App. 1994) {citing Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills
Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st Cir.1982); National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 557-58 (N.D.Cal.1987)).
Under that doctrine, "the bad faith destruction of a document relevant to
proof of an issue at trial gives rise to an inference that production of the
document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its
destruction." Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah
1998) (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th
Cir.1997)). See also Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 557 (f,[w]here one party
wrongfully denies another the evidence necessary to establish a fact in
dispute.")

-44Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is a presumption that the actual currency would have been
helpful to claimant's case and that had the claimant had the opportunity to
have the currency sniffed by a dog and/or examined by an expert witness, it
would have eliminated any significance that the packaging materials had
residue on it. The fact that money is tainted does not prove that the money
was involved in a drug transaction, especially money from the Los Angeles
area. See United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.
1994) ("If greater than seventy-five percent of all circulated currency in Los
Angeles is contaminated with drug residue, it is extremely likely a narcotics
detection dog will positively alert when presented with a large sum of
currency from that area.")
Based upon the spoliation of evidence doctrine, plaintiff is entitled to
have no significance attach to the canine sniff of the packaging. No
discernable controlled substances were found on the packaging. Claimant
was left with no opportunity to prove or examine the currency.
CONCLUSION
The Utah seizure and forfeiture statutes require that the State prove
that the currency in question was intended to be used in exchange for a
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controlled substance. The parties stipulated before the trial court that the
currency was not traceable to any drug transaction. Given the stipulation,
trial court's judgment that the currency was forfeitable was clearly
erroneous.
Morever, the parties stipulated before the trial court that Hank
Lachman did not give the UHP consent to search his trunk. The UHP had
no probable cause and no exigent circumstances justified opening the trunk.
Once the trunk was open, the UHP had no probable cause and no exigent
circumstances justified seizing the currency. Thus, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the currency and the currency should be
returned to claimant.
If the trial court's order and judgment stands, it acts as a fine of over
$73,000 to claimant Hank Lachman for a simple speeding warning. Such a
fine violates Mr. Lachman's protections against excessive fines under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9
of the Utah Constitution.
Similarly, the differing burdens of proof between an in rem civil
forfeiture and a forfeiture pursuant to a criminal action, violates claimant's
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equal protection and due process protections under both the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions.
Finally, depositing the currency into a bank account prior to a seizure
warrant issuing and before the claimant could inspect the currency,
constitutes spoliation of evidence. As such, claimant is entitled to a
presumption that the actual currency would have been beneficial to him.
Given this presumption, the finding by the trial court that forfeiture was
proper is clearly not justified.
Given the above arguments and facts, the trial court's amended
forfeiture order should be reversed and this Court should order the currency
returned to claimant, with interest and taxable costs.
DATED thi^fC day of December, 2000.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN

... /PV#£Alan W. Mortensen
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session

58-37-13 Property subject to forfeiture --Seizure --Procedure
July 1, 2001].

[Effective until

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in rem complaint seeking forfeiture or
m y criminal information or indictment which contains or is amended to include a
iemand for forfeiture of a defendant's in personam interest in any property which
Ls subject to forfeiture.
(b) "Drug distributing paraphernalia" means any property used or designed to
oe used in the illegal transportation, storage, shipping, or circulation of a
controlled substance. Property is considered "designed to be used" for
one or
nore of the above-listed purposes if the property has been altered or modified to
include a feature or device which would actually promote or conceal a violation
of this chapter.
(c) "Drug manufacturing equipment or supplies" includes any illegally
possessed controlled substance precursor, or any chemical, laboratory equipment,
Dr laboratory supplies possessed with intent to engage in clandestine laboratory
operation as defined in Section 58-37d-3.
(d) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section 70A-9105(1)(m), a mortgagee, lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security interest
or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in property, whose interest would be
perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A person who holds property
for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for another, or who is not in
substantial compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be
recorded or reflected in public records in order to perfect the interest against
a good faith purchaser for value, is not an interest holder.
(e) "Proceeds" means property acquired directly or indirectly from, produced
through, realized through, or caused by an act or omission and includes any
property of any kind without reduction for expenses incurred in the acquisition,
maintenance, or production of that property, or any other
purpose.
(f) "Resolution of criminal charges" occurs at the time a claimant who is
also charged with violations under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d
enters a plea, upon return of a jury verdict or court ruling in a criminal trial,
or upon dismissal of the criminal charge.
(g) "Violation of this chapter" means any conduct prohibited by Title 58,
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Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the state
vhich would be a violation of the laws of the place where the conduct occurred
and which would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d if
:he conduct had occurred in this state.
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in
;hem:
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or intended
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including
capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to
administer controlled substances in violation of this chapter;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections
(2)(a) and (2)(b), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless the
owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or knew
or had reason to know of the violation of this chapter;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any
act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent;
and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an interest
holder who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of reasonable
diligence that a violation would or did take place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes,
and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for
a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of this chapter. An interest in property may not be forfeited under
this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
interest holder knew, had reason to know of, or consented to the conduct which
made the property subject to forfeiture. The burden of presenting this evidence
shall be upon the state;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in
violation of this chapter, except that:
Copr.
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(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest
Ln real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder who did not know
:>r have reason to know after the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if
:he interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the conduct which made
:he property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the conduct;
md
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
nanufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or storage facility
Dr interest in real property may not be forfeited under this subsection unless
cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street value of any controlled substances
Eound on the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics
Dfficer experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to
establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection;
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in relation
to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or
located within the proximity of controlled substances or other property subject
to forfeiture under this section; and
(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to
forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment
or supplies,
drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of importation,
manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are proceeds traceable to a
violation of this chapter. The burden of proof is upon the claimant of the
property to rebut this presumption.
(3) (a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any
peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or
an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment
in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under
this chapter;
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(iv) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or intended to be used in violation of this chapter and has probable
cause to believe the property will be damaged, intentionally diminished in value,
destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state.
(b) Upon the filing of a complaint, the court shall immediately issue to
the seizing agency a warrant for seizure of any property subject to forfeiture
which had been seized without a warrant in a manner described in this subsection.
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), forfeiture proceedings under
Copr.
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Subsection (9) shall be instituted within 90 days of the seizure. The time period
aay by extended by the court having jurisdiction over the property upon notice to
ill claimants and interest holders and for good cause shown.
(5) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
:ustody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When
property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under
tfhich it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for
disposition in accordance with law.
(6) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred,
distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this chapter are
contraband and no property right shall exist in them. All substances listed in
Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state may be
retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or
other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the state.
(7) All marijuana or any species of plants from which controlled substances in
Schedules I and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation
of this chapter, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild
growths, may be seized and retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose,
including sampling or other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the
state. Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture
of the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request that
the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the seizing
agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of controlled
substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over the case
shall award the
property to the seizing agency. Each agency shall use the forfeited property for
controlled substance law enforcement purposes only. Forfeited property or
proceeds from the sale of forfeited property may not be used to pay any cash
incentive, award, or bonus to any peace officer or individual acting as an agent
for the agency, nor may it be used to supplant any ordinary operating expense of
the agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal
costs incurred in filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited
under this section may not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed
against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency,
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific property
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or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use
in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the payment of costs to the
county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney for
legal costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the
property to the director of the Division of Finance. The application shall
clearly set forth the need for the property and the use to which the property
will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications
for property submitted under Subsection (8)(b) and, if the seizing agency makes
no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant or seizing agency,
where no application is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all
costs to the appropriate department. The Division of Finance shall in turn
reimburse the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the
forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the
sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to
the seizing agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or
(b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by
public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction
shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge
of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated
agent.
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows:
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a complaint
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district,
the district attorney, or the attorney general, and
filed in a court of record
where the property was seized or is to be seized. In cases in which the claimant
of the property is also charged as a criminal defendant, the complaint shall be
filed in the county where the criminal charges arose, regardless of the location
of the property. The complaint shall include:
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture.
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant, the
forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in personam
action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to forfeiture. A
defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but may acknowledge or
deny interest in the property at the time of first appearance on the criminal
charges. If a criminal information or indictment is amended to include a demand
for forfeiture, the defendant may respond to the demand at the time of the
amendment.
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the determination
of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the criminal charges. Hearing
on the forfeiture shall be before the court without a jury. The court may
consider any evidence presented in the criminal case, and receive any other
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evidence offered by the state or the defendant. The court shall determine by a
)reponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or
release of the property as it determines.
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture action, to
stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for hearing on the
forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal charges. Either party may move
:he court to enter a finding of forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or
ill of the property, either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a
finding, the court shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the
:riminal charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate judgment, and
m y motion for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action
nay not create a separate proceeding. Upon the granting of a motion by the
iefendant for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action,
:he defendant shall be considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has
Deen twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture
ander this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a complaint filed
jnder this subsection. Following the entry of an in personam forfeiture order, or
jpon the filing of a petition for release under Subsection (e), the county
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may proceed with a separate in
rem action to resolve any other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture.
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2) (k) shall be prepared
by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the district
attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of a criminal
prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the property alleged to
be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property is seized or encumbered,
if the proceeds are located outside the state. A finding that property is the
proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not require proof that the property
is the proceeds of any particular exchange or transaction. Proof that property is
proceeds may be shown by evidence which establishes all of the following by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this chapter;
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period when the
conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a reasonable time after
that period; and
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than conduct in
violation of the chapter.
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
clerk of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county attorney or
district attorney to have a claim in the property by:
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal information
or indictment; and
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is known or to
each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor
Vehicles to the address given upon the records of the division, which service is
Copr.
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:onsidered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The
:ounty attorney, district attorney, or attorney general shall make one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure
vas made for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are
Delieved to have an interest in the property.
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint
within 2 0 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter, any
Interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with
a
complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a
complaint of forfeiture.
(f) For civil actions in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint
or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is
Dn file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
property as the court determines. If the county attorney or district attorney has
not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the
evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it
shall enter an order directing the county attorney or district attorney to answer
the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the end of
2 0 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing. At this hearing all
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine
by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or
release of the property as it determines.
(h) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the property in
whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited.
(i) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and
release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. When the
property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall
order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of
the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of
sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund.
(j) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in whole
Copr. ® West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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DT in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding,
including seizure and storage of the property, against the
individual or
individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may assess costs
against any other claimant or claimants to the property as appropriate.
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-13
UT ST § 58-37-13
END OF DOCUMENT
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Amendment IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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U.S Const, amend. XIII.
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Amendment VIII.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
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Amendment XIV***
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
/ enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
1896
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Sec. 9. [Excessive bail andfines— Cruel punishments.l
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed;
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
1896
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APPENDIX G:
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 24.
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Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
FILED

MAR 2 3 2000
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY.

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT .JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR 'GKRmrT^W^
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS,
($73,130.00) UNITED STATES
CURRENCY
Defendant,

Case No.

9907-207

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

This case was heard on February 24, 2000.

The court first

addressed the question whether the answer of claimant Hank
Lachman ("Lachman") was timely and whether the court would
enlarge the time for answering.

It appears from the record that- the complaint and notice of
seizure for the forfeiture were mailed to Lachman as the statue
requires on December 21, 1999.

Section 58-37-13(9) (e) , Utah Code

Annotated (1998) requires that the answer be filed within twenty
days after service.

Rule 5(b)(1)(B), U.R.C.P., provides that

service is complete upon mailing.

Rule 6(e), U.R.C.P., provides

that whenever a party is required to do some act within a
prescribed period after the service of a paper upon him, and
service is by mailing, three days are added to the prescribed
period.

Accordingly, Lachman's answer must have been filed by
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January 13, 3000.

Lachman did not file his answer until January

26, 2000, thirteen days late.

Lachman maintains that he did not receive the complaint
until January 4, 2000.

Lachman has not offered any explanation

for why it would have taken from December 21, 19 99, to January 4,
2000, for him to receive the mailed complaint.

It was mailed by

certified mail, return receipt requested, so perhaps Lachman
elected not to pick up the mail until January 4, 2000.

Since

Lachman has not presented the actual envelope in which the
complaint was delivered, the court has no way of attributing this
delay to Lachman or to the U. S. Postal Service.

In any event,

Lachman received the complaint nine days before the filing
deadline.

It is fairly routine for the court to grant extensions of
time to answer complaints in civil cases if the delay is a matter
of a few days and appears to be due to inadvertence of counsel.
There is no inadvertence of counsel here.

Lachman did not

deliver the complaint to his counsel until January 22 or 23,
2000, long after the deadline had passed.

The delay of thirteen

days is more substantial than the usual delay, and Lachman has
not presented any evidence assigning any responsibility to the
mail carrier.
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In most cases, the equities favor permitting the defendant
to assert his defenses so that the case can be resolved on the
merits.

Here, there is significant evidence of lack of good

faith on Lachman's part.

He denied any knowledge about or

ownership of the defendant currency when it was taken on December
14, 1999, but now unabashedly asserts that he did know what it
was and that it belongs to him.

The law should not favor playing

these kinds of games with the truth.

Lachman's motion for enlargement of time is denied and the
court proceeds on the basis that the answer is not timely and
should not be considered.

• .-.

Notwithstanding this determination, the court must still
make a finding that the currency is forfeitable.

Otherwise, it

would presumably be turned over to the State of Utah as unclaimed
property.

In addition, should Lachman elect to appeal the denial

of his motion, final resolution of this matter would be expedited
by trial court consideration of the merits of the underlying
claim.

Lachman and the State agreed that the court can decide

whether the currency should be forfeited based upon the materials
submitted by Lachman with his motion for summary judgment, with
additional facts stipulated at the February 24, 2000, hearing.
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From those materials and the stipulated facts, the court finds as
follows:

1.

Lachman was stopped on 1-70 eastbound for speeding on

December 13, 1999, by Trooper Ken Ballantyne.

He was traveling

from Los Angeles, California, to Denver, Colorado, in a car
rented by a Sam Scott ("Scott").

Lachman was an authorized

driver, but reported that Scott had been unable to make the trip
because his wife had a baby.

Lachman appeared to be talking to

himself while Trooper Ballantyne was writing the ticket.

The car

had white skis with old style bindings and a black bag on the
back seat.

2.

On December 14, 1999, Trooper Keith Wilson stopped Lachman

for speeding on the same road five miles west of where he had
been stopped the day before.

Lachman was westbound.

Trooper

Wilson ran a check on Lachman's license and found that Lachman
had been arrested for a drug offense.
be talking to himself.

Lachman again appeared to

Lachman explained the absence of Scott as

he had done the day before, then explained that he had gone to
Denver to see his girlfriend, but had fought with her and decided
to go back home.

He told the officer that he had known her for

about a month and that her name was Diana Bloan.
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3.

Trooper Wilson asked Lachman if he had anything illegal in

the vehicle.

Lachman answered that he did not and offered to

allow the trooper to look. When the trooper asked how to open the
trunk, Lachman told him how.

Lachman did not assert that his

consent had extended only to the passenger compartment.

The

trunk contained a box wrapped in Christmas wrapping paper.

There

was also a strong air freshener odor in the trunk.

4.

Lachman was asked what was in the package.

He answered that

his friend had bought a gift for Lachman's girlfriend, and asked
Lachman to deliver the gift.

Lachman denied knowing what the

gift was and said that he had decided not to deliver it because
of the fight with his girlfriend.

5.

Lachman continued to pay particular attention to the

Christmas package.

When asked for the girlfriend's name again,

he stated that it was Diana Blanch.

He was asked if he would

open the package, but declined to do so.

When asked for a

receipt for his stay in Denver, he presented a November 16, 1999,
receipt, and said he had been there a month earlier.

Lachman

also stated at this time that he, Scott, and Diana had known each
other for ten to fifteen years, even though he had earlier stated
that he had known Diana for only a month.
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6.

Troopers Wilson and Ballantyne consulted with each other, and

by phone with Sergeant Rich Haycock.

Haycock said he would speak

with the county attorney and call back.

When Haycock called

back, he eventually spoke directly with Lachman.

Haycock told

Lachman that the police concern focused on the package and that
there was no need to delay Lachman further if he would let the
police take possession of the package.
receipt.

Lachman asked for a

Lachman repeatedly asserted that the package was not

his and that he knew nothing about it, except that Scott had
asked him to give it to Lachman's girlfriend.

7.

Trooper Wilson partially opened the package at the scene

after Lachman had departed with his receipt.

When he observed

the currency, he closed the package and brought it to Moab.

8.

The currency inside the package and the wrapper in which the

currency was packaged were both subjected to independent sniff
tests by a certified drug dog.

The dog alerted to the odor of

drugs on both the wrapper and the currency.

However, no

measurable amount of any controlled substance was found on either
the currency or the wrapper.
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9.

Lachman now asserts that he is the owner of the currency,

that he knew the currency was in the package, and that he had
placed it there for safekeeping.

ANALYSIS

Property is forfeitable under Section 58-37-13, Utah code
Annotated (1998), if it is furnished or intended to be furnished
in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of Utah Law,
or where the actual or intended exchange would violate Utah law
if it were to occur in Utah.

The state must establish this by a

preponderance of the evidence.

The court is persuaded that the defendant currency was
received in exchange for a controlled substance, or intended to
be exchanged for a controlled substance.

The facts set forth

above persuade the court that Lachman brought the currency back
from Denver on December 14, 1999, in exchange for drugs delivered
on December 13, 1999, or as an advance payment on a shipment to
occur at a later date.

Any innocent explanation of the facts is

too far fetched to believe.
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Lachman asserts that seizure of the package without a
warrant bars forfeiture.
on December 21, 1999.

The police did obtain a seizure warrant

Some delay between taking possession of

the vehicle contents and obtaining a warrant is to be expected.
Moreover, the package was surrendered to the police by Lachman at
a time when he claimed no interest in it.

Lachman has cited no

authority supporting his position that property may not be
forfeited if a seizure warrant is issued after the police
exercise control over the property.

Such a requirement would not

be reasonable for property in a vehicle traveling on freeways in
remote corners of Utah.

Lachman also asserts that the police lacked authority to
open the trunk and open the package.

Lachman's consent to look

in the vehicle extended to opening the trunk.

These claims are

also rejected because they only affect what evidence the court
can consider; they do not operate as a complete bar to
forfeiture.

Lachman did not seek to suppress any evidence on the

theory that it had been gathered in violation of his rights.

Finally, Lachman claims that forfeiture violates the
excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Where currency

is clearly the product of illegal drug sales, this issue was
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resolved in State v. $175,800, 942 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1997).

That

is the case here.

Counsel for plaintiff should submit a formal judgment of
forfeiture pursuant to Rule 4-504.

Dated this 2^^J^

day of March, 2000.

Lyl£^£. Anderson, District Judge
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND CLAIMANT
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS,
(573,130.00) UNITED STATES
CURRENCY,

ORDER TO VACATE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT, DENYING DEFENDANT
AND CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
AMENDED FORFEITURE ORDER
Civil No. 9907-207
Judge Anderson

Defendant.

The above entitled matter came before 'he Court on May 17, 2000. before the Honorable
Lyle R. Anderson to hear the Claimant's motions to vacate the default judgment entered by the
Court on February 23, 2000, and to amend the forfeiture order entered on April 5, 2000.
I.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT
With regards to claimant's motion to vacate the default judgment entered against

claimant, based upon the newly discovered evidence as set forth in the facts in the Memorandum
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of Points and Authorities in Support of Claimant's Motion for Relief of Default Judgment,
coupled with plaintiff stipulating at the hearing to the granting claimant's motion to vacate the
default judgment, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the default judgment entered against
claimant is hereby vacated and claimant's answer shall be considered.
II.

AMENDED FORFEITURE ORDER
With regards to claimant's motion to amend the April 5, 2000 forfeiture order, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED THAT the forfeiture order shall be amended, as follows:
This matter having come before the Court for hearing on February 23, 2000, before the
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, and the Court heard the matter and issued a Memorandum
Decision, incorporated herein, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The search of claimant Hank Lachman's trunk by the Utah Highway Patrol

Officers was done with Mr. Lachman's consent and the seizure of the money in his trunk was
proper.
2.

Depositing the seized money into a bank account did not constitute spoliation of

evidence.
3.

The Utah Forfeiture Statute does not violate claimant Hank Lachman's equal

protection, due process and/or excessive fines protections under the Utah and/or United States
Constitutions.
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4.

The United States currency described herein had been or was intended to be used

by claimant Hank Lachman in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the laws of the
state of Utah.
Based upon these findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary
judgment filed by claimant is denied and the United States Currency described herein is hereby
forfeited to the State of Utah, the seizing agency, to be used in its enforcement of Utah's
controlled substance laws.
DATED t h i s - ^ day of

) 1/r\iL

, 2000.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of May, 2000, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was mailed via US MAIL, postage prepaid, to:

William L. Benge
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY
125 East Center Street
Moab, Utah 84532

By
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of C.J.A., hereby provides the following statement of
undisputed facts, which demonstrate that Defendant and claimant Hank D. Lachman, are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
1.

On or about December 13, 1999, claimant Hank D. Lachman was stopped and

cited by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Ballantyne for speeding while traveling from his
home in Los Angeles, California to Denver, Colorado on 1-70. See Statement of Ballantyne at p.
11 of Wilson deposition Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Trooper Ballantyne did not
search the vehicle or the trunk at that time. Id.
2.

The next afternoon, on December 14, 1999, Mr. Lachman was pulled over for

speeding by Trooper Keith Wilson on 1-70 in Grand County while heading back to California.
3.

Mr. Lachman did not in any manner try to evade Trooper Wilson and was

compliant in slowing down and pulling over when Trooper Wilson turned on his lights. See
Lachman deposition, attached hereto as Exhibit B, at p. 7, Wilson deposition at video clip 12,
attached hereto as Exhibit C.
4.

Mr. Lachman had a valid California driver's license. Lachman depo. at p. 7,

Wilson statement at p. 2 of Wilson deposition Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Exhibit D.
5.

Mr. Lachman was driving a rental car from Budget Rental car and was an

authorized driver of the car. See Budget Information, attached hereto as Exhibit E.
6.

Shortly after Mr. Lachman was pulled over, Trooper Ballantyne showed up and

pulled along side Trooper Wilson's vehicle.
2
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7.

Trooper Wilson believed that Mr. Lachman was acting very nervous and that his

behavior was evidence that Mr. Lachman was under the influence of drugs. See Wilson
Statement at p. 2.
8.

Trooper Wilson's vehicle had no video camera inside of it. Trooper Ballantyne's

vehicle was equipped with a video camera that is programed to turn on when his lights are turned
on. See Wilson depo. at clip 1.
9.

Trooper Wilson asked if they could search the vehicle. Mr. Lachman gave them

consent to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See Lachman depo. at p. 14,
Ballantyne Statement at p. 12.
10.

Trooper Wilson interpreted Mr. Lachman's consent to search the passenger

compartment to include the trunk and made no distinction between searching the passenger
compartment and the trunk. See Wilson depo. at clip 13.
11.

Trooper Ballantyne searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. His

search of the passenger compartment revealed no odor of marijuana, either in raw form or
smoked, nor did the search find any drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment or any
other controlled substance or contraband. See Lachman depo. at pp. 15-16, Wilson depo. at clip
2.
12.

Trooper Wilson asked Hank Lachman how to open his trunk and Mr. Lachman

showed Trooper Wilson where the trunk latch was located. See Lachman depo. at p. 16
13.

Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he could search his trunk and Mr. Lachman

informed the Troopers and their superior Sargent Haycock, that he did not give them consent to
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search the trunk. See Lachman depo. at p. 16; Ballantyne Statement at pp. 13-14; Haycock
Statement at p. 16, attached hereto as Exhibit F.
14.

Trooper Wilson opened the trunk anyway. See Lachman depo. at p. 17.

15.

The Utah Highway Patrol Troopers did not at any time obtain a warrant to search

the vehicle, nor did they have a drug sniffing canine. See Lachman depo. at p. 16; Wilson depo.
at clip 15.
16.

In the trunk was located a suit case, which Trooper Wilson searched without the

consent of Mr. Lachman and without a warrant or a search dog. See Lachman depo. at p. 20.
17.

In the suitcase, Trooper Wilson located some cigarette papers. See Lachman

depo. at p. 22, Wilson Statement at p. 3.
18.

Hank Lachman is a smoker and rolls his own cigarettes and informed the UHP

Troopers of such. See Lachman depo. at p. 22, Wilson Statement at p. 3.
19.

The cigarette papers were not seized by Trooper Wilson, nor were they considered

to be drug paraphernalia or contraband. See Lachman depo. at p. 22; Wilson depo. at clip 3.
20.

Located in the trunk was also a Christmas package. See Lachman depo. at p. 23.

21.

There was no drug paraphernalia, drug manufacturing equipment, narcotics,

controlled substances or smell of marijuana in the trunk. See Lachman depo. at pp. 24-25;
Wilson depo. at clip 4.
22.

Finally, after the search of the vehicle had been conducted, Trooper Ballantyne

turned on his video camera. See Wilson depo. at clip 5.
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23.

At this point in time, Trooper Wilson called Sargent Haycock and Sargent

Haycock called Grand County Attorney William Benge to discuss what could be done with
regards to the Christmas gift. Mr. Benge advised the UHP that there was not enough evidence to
obtain a warrant to open the Christmas gift. See Wilson statement at p. 4.
24.

Mr. Lachman apparently initially denied any knowledge of the contents of the

box. See Wilson statement at p. 3; Ballantyne statement at p. 13; Haycock Statement at p. 15.
25.

Trooper Wilson asked Mr. Lachman if he would open the package or if they could

open the package. Mr. Lachman told the Troopers that he would not open the package and he
did not consent to it being opened. See Lachman depo. at p. 25; Ballantyne Statement at p. 13;
Haycock Statement at p. 16.
26.

Sargent Haycock spoke with Mr. Lachman via cell phone and told him that if he

would leave the package with the Troopers, that he would then be free to leave. See Haycock
Statement at p. 16.
27.

•

Mr. Lachman agreed to leave the package with the Troopers as long as he received

a property receipt from them that was signed by Mr. Lachman, Trooper Wilson and Trooper
Ballantyne. See Property Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit G; Ballantyne Statement at p. 13;
Haycock Statement at p. 15.
28.

Once Mr. Lachman was assured of having a property receipt for the package, his

nervousness ended and he calmed down significantly. See Wilson depo. at clip 6.
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29.

Hank Lachman did know the contents of the box. He assured Sargent Haycock

that there was nothing illegal in the box or anything dangerous to his troopers. See Haycock
Statement at p. 15.
30.

Mr. Lachman was extremely nervous about having so much cash on hand and

placed it in a Christmas box for "safety purposes." See Lachman depo. at p. 27.
31.

Mr. Lachman knew that there was no controlled substances, no drug

manufacturing equipment and no drug paraphernalia in the box. See Lachman depo. at p. 27.
32.

Once Mr. Lachman received the assurance that he would get a receipt, he felt

comfortable that he would get the package back later. See Lachman depo. at p. 27.
33.

The receipt that was given to Hank Lachman lists Hank Lachman as the subject of

the package. See Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit G.
34.

The receipt maintained in the UHP files names Sam Scott as the owner of the

package. See Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit H.
35.

Even though Trooper Wilson originally believed that Mr. Lachman was under the

influence of drugs or had something illegal in his car, Hank Lachman was not arrested for any
violation of Utah law or otherwise given a traffic citation, but rather was given a "friendly
contact" warning notice and was sent on his way home. See Warning, attached hereto as Exhibit
I.
36.

During the seizure procedure, Trooper Wilson placed the package into his trunk

without wrapping it or otherwise protecting it from becoming corrupted by any drug residue that
may be in his trunk. See Wilson depo. at clip 7.
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37.

Trooper Wilson did not believe that there was anything dangerous about the

package. See Wilson depo. at clip 17.
38.

After Mr. Lachman drove off, Trooper Wilson took the package out of his trunk

and opened it without a search warrant and observed that the package was filled with money. See
Wilson depo. at clip 9.
39.

After observing that the package was filled with money, Trooper Wilson did not

pursue Mr. Lachman. See Wilson depo. at clip 8.
40.

Trooper Wilson took the package and its contents back to the Moab UHP Post and

opened the package and removed the contents with Sargent Haycock, without obtaining a search
warrant. See Wilson depo. at clip 9; Haycock Statement at p. 16.
41.

The package contained $73,130 in cash.

42.

Trooper Wilson testified that it is not illegal to carry cash on one's person. See

Wilson depo. at clip 16.
43.

Trooper Wilson and Sargent Haycock found no detectable, collectable or

forfeitable controlled substances on the currency or in the package materials. See Wilson depo.
at clip 10.
44.

The currency was deposited into First Security Bank on the evening of December

14, 1999. Haycock Statement at p. 16; Deposit Receipt, attached hereto as Exhibit J.
45.

Two days later on December 16, 1999, two dogs alerted to the odor of narcotics

on the packaging materials. However, the amount or type of controlled substances that may have
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been sniffed by the dogs are not quantifiable or identifiable. See Canine Report, attached hereto
as Exhibit K.
46.

The currency that was seized and which is sought to be forfeited in this case has

not been traced to any drug transaction in or out of the state of Utah. See Wilson depo. at clip 11.
47.

The complaint filed in this matter was served via certified mail upon Hank

Lachman and Sam Scott, the person who Mr. Lachman claimed was the owner of the package
until Mr. Lachman was given a receipt for the package.
48.

Mr. Lachman is the only person who filed a verified answer in this matter.

49.

The only property that is being sought for forfeiture is the currency. The State of

Utah is not attempting to seize and forfeit any of the alleged traces of any controlled substance
that was allegedly found on the packaging materials. See Complaint.

ARGUMENT
1.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Averett v. Grange. 909 P.2d 246, 248
(Utah 1996). As stated below, there are no set of facts, disputed or otherwise, that can support
judgment for the plaintiff in this matter. Thus, summary judgment should be granted.
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Alan W. Mortensen(A6616)
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD
371 North 200 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801)294-2318

f*
v

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT AND CLAIMANT
HANKLACHMAN

v.

Civil No. 9907-207

SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS,
($73,130.00) UNITED STATES
CURRENCY,

Judge Anderson

Defendant.

Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record and defendant and claimant Hank D.
Lachman, by and through counsel of record, based upon an oral stipulation made at the forfeiture
hearing on February 23, 2000, hereby stipulate as follows:
1.

The facts 1 through 49 presented in the Defendant's and Claimant's "Statement of

Undisputed Facts" contained in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's and Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment are true, accurate and undisputed by
all parties.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

It is likewise true, accurate and undisputed by all parties that on December 16,

1999, two drug dogs alerted to an odor of controlled substances on the packaging that contained
the $73,130.00, though no discemable controlled substance was found on the packaging.
DATED thisT^aay of March, 2000.
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD

Alan W. Mortensen, attorney for defendant and
claimant Hank D. Lachman

DATED this _ day of March, 2000.
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

plaintiff State of
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _[_/_ day of March, 2000, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, via federal express overnight, postage prepaid, to:

William L. Benge
GRAND COUNTY ATTORNEY
125 East Center Street
Moab, Utah 84532

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX L:
Property Receipt

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IJ

r

!

CD

H

2
-(

'N ?

o
CO
vj

3

I

/T
CD

o

z

Y*

NJ
NJ

<

K

O

£

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^

ro

APPENDIX M:
"Friendly" Warning Notice

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

P T\
COMVIE^CIAL VEHICLE INFORMATION

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL

n»-if:

;FiqfiTl

fl-id-n i I T

;Wi<L

rv>^

u: 3c-».
OMT

|

uxsm

»eu„.

2JP

oos \ *s z " C I

WARNING NOTICE
STATE OF UTAH

3TATT

ii J ***T

, VEHIC

VEHICXS MA<C

TYPET

z*y
1

1I5 is not a aummons to appear In Court,
is a friendly contact by the Highway
itro* regarding improper drMng or Uie
echanicaJ condition of your vehicle. Tha
igftway Patrol requetts your cooperation
decreasing the number of motor vehicle
radents by obeying all traffic regulations
xl maintaining your vehicle in safe
ochancaJ condition

WE CARE
BUCKLE UP

WHVEAJVE
5RT

Y^TT?

^ ^

DATE, TIME 4 LOCATION OF OCCURENCE

ON

.•.8^-M.LfTXPyriUE/^5^

THE.

(• - I

T-"'A
UXATCN,
•

•*""

*—'

"VUIUTV

T \_»~w

il

7
TTE
.yiLEPoar.

- VIOLATIONS C3 lmorop#r tumrg
Q \nx»onq trtflv:

f? Farf to Hop - U71 cr fcgn:

C Impropfjr tarxn;

D **r* of wtr

C P*< to rep - 't*»«tf n y \ *

C LifMi • *+**> m

Z Fdowiog inr dDM*/

CF*IIOooey scnooiOil «^*a

Z D^»irg on w*jng *<f

Z F«*10 oi- t^tt

Z Iquftrum

10ai»ctvt D'Uti

C Paring

3 FfOctt' <m \%ot*3on

C 0"*t4», *OU*or

Z C*OU dhri3#/ of N n t '
3 imorooer ottanc

G Untune fUT^wty

6ACGE

5>

•»fjrar

"V

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

***

